Detecção de indícios econômicos de cartel na revenda de Gás Liquefeito de Petróleo (GLP), em Goiânia-GO

Abstract

The objective of this article was to analyze the economic signs of cartel in the resale of LPG, in Goiânia-GO, from May 2004 to June 2020. The filter of the National Petroleum Agency (ANP) was used; the Local Gaussian Correlation method; the price volatility model, according to Bolotova, Connor e Miller (2008); and the Error Correction Model (ECM). The result of the ANP filter indicated that there are economic signs of cartel in this market. On the other hand, the local Gaussian correlation suggested that this hypothesis was accepted for small time intervals. The volatility model indicated that the average LPG resale price in Goiânia-GO increased during the collusion. However, the reduction in variance was not corroborated. The MCE results indicated evidence of economic signs of cartel, only in the short term. The instability of the cartels may explain, at least in part, these results. Some agreements can prevail for very short intervals, and those that exist for prolonged periods often engage in price warfare as retaliation for uncooperative behavior.