Heidegger e o ápice da metafísica

Abstract

This thesis aims to problematize the proposal of overcoming metaphysics presented by Heidegger and, with it, the place of his thought in the stage in which Western philosophy reaches its extreme possibility. Some critics argue that his question of being inaugurates a new mode of unveiling in the history of Western thought. And, therefore, they consider him either as a philosopher of the end of metaphysics, or as responsible for the emergence of a post-modern and post-humanist thought. We will see throughout this thesis that, despite such interpretations, Heidegger does not understand the possibility of overcoming metaphysics as a closure of the preceding history. But as a recognition of the unveiling of being as a condition for the historicity from which metaphysics unfolded and in which we are situated. With that, we will see that he is not consistent with his philosophy to think of it as an effort to break with this tradition, nor to think of the possibility of an epochal transition as an effort of an individual will. Such an overcoming depends on the dispositions of the being's own history.