A teoria do juízo de Bertrand Russell

Abstract

Bertrand Russell, through his theory of judgment, undertakes a logical investigation on the epistemological distinctions, whose result should be the identification of the formal conditions of distinction between a false judgment and a true judgment, after the analysis of the formal conditions of a judgment whichever it may be, in which context the propositional sense would objectify. Thus, the subject of this research is Russell’s theory of judgment, particularly in the period from 1910 to 1913, in which he presents 3 distinct versions of his theory: the one which is found in a 1910 essay, entitled “Of the Nature of Truth an Falsehood”, published in the Philosophical Essays; the 1912 version, presented in the text “Truth and Falsehood”, chapter XII of the book Problems of Philosophy; and the 1913 version, of the unfinished manuscript Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript, posthumously published in 1974. In those works, trying to objectify the propositional sense, Russell conceives judgment as a multiple relation, which raises problems of logical order, which his theory manages to accomplish, always up to a certain point. Our paper cuts out, therefore, the philosophical universe of the Russellian thought, turning to the reasons for the difficulties found by Russell in his logical undertaking. We will emphasize the singularity of each one of the versions, but we will also emphasize the continuity of his undertaking, so that difference and similarity will form a single route, translating not only the degree of difficulty but also the importance of the problem for a logical project such as Russell’s. With that, on examining the whole of those problems and of the internal solutions to that project, we believe to be, in some way, contributing to the understanding of his philosophy as a whole, as we emphasize a constant feature of his way to deal with logical difficulties.