https://repositorio.ufba.br/handle/ri/2335 Thu, 14 May 2026 14:15:17 GMT 2026-05-14T14:15:17Z https://repositorio.ufba.br/handle/ri/44454 Título: KANT E A PROBLEMÁTICA DO MUNDO REAL Autor(es): BRAGA, DAVID BARROSO Primeiro Orientador: ITAPARICA, ANDRÉ LUIS MOTA Abstract: In order to resolve the conflicts of reason with itself, conflicts that manifest in the contradictions (Widersprüche) of metaphysical castles, Kant undertakes a self-analysis of reason to determine what it can or cannot know independently of the senses and experience. As a result of this self-analysis, he concludes that human reason can only know a priori the form of knowledge, that is, its peculiar way of knowing objects. This leads to a new way of conceiving the real world, as human beings cannot know things as they are in themselves, but only things as they appear (als Erscheinungen), thus modified by the human way of knowing. Although this new way of conceiving the real world fully expresses Transcendental Idealism, the fundamental thesis of the Critique of Pure Reason, it seems to rest on another real world that does not appear but is presupposed as the guarantor of phenomenal reality: the world of things in themselves (Ding an sich selbst). However, as presupposing the reality of things in themselves means both engaging in Transcendental Realism (transzendentaler Realismus) and resurrecting the conflicts of reason, Kant, in the Fourth Paralogism of the first edition of the Critique (1781), argues that the reality of external objects can be testified by mere consciousness (immediate perception), since human beings do not deal with things in themselves but only with phenomena. As, from this perspective, it is not necessary to leave mere consciousness (bloßen Selbstbewußtsein) to prove the reality of external phenomena (KrV, A370; A375), critics of Transcendental Idealism (transzendentalen Idealismus) saw in this thesis a striking similarity between this idealism and Berkeleyan idealism, from which they accused Kant’s philosophy of being solipsistic. In response, Kant, in the Refutation of Idealism, a text included in the second edition of the Critique (1787), states that the empirical determination of existence (internal experience) presupposes something permanent (Beharrliche) external (which is not a representation) as its condition of possibility. From this, he concludes that “the consciousness of my own existence is, simultaneously, an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things exterior to me (anderer Dinge außer mir)” (KrV, B276). Considering this manifest oscillation between defending the external real world now as being constituted exclusively by phenomena (Fourth Paralogism of 1781), now as presupposing things in themselves (Refutation of Idealism), and thus also implying the existence of an external world constituted by things in themselves, the present thesis aims to highlight a conflicting conceptual structure at the core of Transcendental Philosophy (Transzendentalphilosophie) that prevents it from effectively determining the existence of a world of real external objects. This implies concluding that Kant’s theoretical philosophy inevitably and involuntarily leads to skepticism, as it does not allow for a secure judgment about truly external real objects. Editora / Evento / Instituição: UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DA BAHIA Tipo: Tese Fri, 23 May 2025 00:00:00 GMT https://repositorio.ufba.br/handle/ri/44454 2025-05-23T00:00:00Z https://repositorio.ufba.br/handle/ri/44281 Título: ATITUDE CRÍTICA E PRÁTICAS DE LIBERDADE: AUFKLÄRUNG E PARRESIA EM MICHEL FOUCAULT Autor(es): Farias, Emerson Costa Primeiro Orientador: Aggio, Juliana Ortegosa Abstract: This dissertation investigates the relationship between the critical attitude and practices of freedom in the thought of Michel Foucault, with an emphasis on his problematization of contemporary forms of subjectivation. Drawing on the notion of Aufklärung, understood as a critical stance toward forms of government and power, and on parrhesia — conceived as an ethical-political practice of truth-telling — it analyzes how the subject may resist the excessive conduct of conduct within modern regimes of governmentality. In this context, the study examines the articulation between critical attitude, governmentality, and the liberal conception of freedom, highlighting critique as a mode of resistance. It further explores Foucault’s reflections on parrhesia in relation to the notions of care of the self and the government of self and others, as well as to the interpretation of ancient philosophy through the lens of parrhesiastic practice. Finally, by bringing together the meanings of Aufklärung and parrhesia, the dissertation seeks to understand the role of philosophy as a critical attitude and as a practice of interrogating the present. By sustaining this articulation, it argues that critique does not uncover an inner essence, but rather inaugurates an ongoing process of self-constitution, thereby contributing both to the deepening of debates on Foucault’s philosophy and to reflections on the possibilities for reinventing modes of existence in the contemporary world. Editora / Evento / Instituição: UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DA BAHIA Tipo: Dissertação Wed, 20 Aug 2025 00:00:00 GMT https://repositorio.ufba.br/handle/ri/44281 2025-08-20T00:00:00Z https://repositorio.ufba.br/handle/ri/43346 Título: O personalismo de Emmanuel Mounier: uma filosofia de ação em resposta a um período de crise humanitária Autor(es): Suzart, Gabriel Sousa Primeiro Orientador: Pereira, Leonardo Jorge da Hora Abstract: This dissertation examines the thought of Emmanuel Mounier, focusing on the emergence of personalism as a philosophical response to European nihilism, which was marked by the humanitarian and moral crises that dominated the first five decades of the 20th century. This period—characterized by world wars, economic crises, and technological advancements—contributed, according to Mounier, to the degradation of human dignity. Based on this, the study seeks to understand how Mounier and his personalism position themselves in the face of this decline, proposing a renewal of human and communal relations centered on the person and their dignity. Aiming to highlight the uniqueness of personalism in comparison to other schools of thought of the time, the research also seeks to show how Mounier criticized nihilism and its consequences, such as police states, wars, and spiritual alienation, developing personalism as an active alternative to confront these crises. Thus, the overall goal of this research is to examine the humanitarian fragility identified by Mounier at the beginning of the 20th century—a period already influenced by conflicts and transformations since the previous century. Personalism is presented as a philosophical response to these crises, offering an alternative in the face of the challenges of the era. Furthermore, the research will explore the philosophical structure of personalism, encompassing its anthropology and political philosophy. The study has three specific objectives: (i) to analyze the historical context of the early 20th-century crises and their impact on human relations from Mounier's perspective; (ii) to investigate how personalism can restore human dignity and promote communal coexistence; and (iii) to explore the influences and distinctiveness of Mounier’s personalism, culminating in the proposal developed throughout its formulation. Finally, the methodology adopted is bibliographical and exploratory, with critical analysis of the works of Mounier and other thinkers, contextualizing the development of their ideas amidst the sociopolitical and humanitarian crises of the 20th century. Editora / Evento / Instituição: Universidade Federal da Bahia Tipo: Dissertação Fri, 26 Sep 2025 00:00:00 GMT https://repositorio.ufba.br/handle/ri/43346 2025-09-26T00:00:00Z https://repositorio.ufba.br/handle/ri/42777 Título: Eros e Dionísio: o problema da vontade em Freud e Nietzsche Autor(es): Pêpe, Pedro Teixeira de Castro Primeiro Orientador: Itaparica, André Luís Mota Abstract: The present work aims to investigate the notion of will and its foundations in the theories of Freud and Nietzsche, focusing more specifically on what these authors identify as the foundations of human will, that is, the tendencies that drive the subject to action and guide their psychodynamics. In doing so, we propose a comparative analysis between their respective theories of the Trieb: the doctrine of the will to power and the theory of drives. To this end, we used both the authors’ own writings on the respective topics and those of some of their commentators, as well as the existing literature on the possible relationships between these theories. As a result, we found in the literature a range of opinions regarding the relationship between Freud’s theory and Nietzsche’s theory: some categorically deny the plausibility of considering their ideas as compatible or sympathetic to one another, while others affirm a very significant convergence between them. From our own reading of both authors’ texts, we conclude that the convergence between their theories of Trieb appears to be significant, aligning with the latter group of theorists and disagreeing with the former. We then seek to justify this assertion based on textual evidence that supports this interpretation. Editora / Evento / Instituição: Universidade Federal da Bahia Tipo: Dissertação Wed, 11 Jun 2025 00:00:00 GMT https://repositorio.ufba.br/handle/ri/42777 2025-06-11T00:00:00Z