DSpace Coleção:https://repositorio.ufba.br/handle/ri/34552026-05-05T21:36:09Z2026-05-05T21:36:09ZKANT E A PROBLEMÁTICA DO MUNDO REALBRAGA, DAVID BARROSOhttps://repositorio.ufba.br/handle/ri/444542026-05-05T18:10:29Z2025-05-23T00:00:00ZTítulo: KANT E A PROBLEMÁTICA DO MUNDO REAL
Autor(es): BRAGA, DAVID BARROSO
Primeiro Orientador: ITAPARICA, ANDRÉ LUIS MOTA
Abstract: In order to resolve the conflicts of reason with itself, conflicts that manifest in the contradictions (Widersprüche) of metaphysical castles, Kant undertakes a self-analysis of reason to determine what it can or cannot know independently of the senses and experience. As a result of this self-analysis, he concludes that human reason can only know a priori the form of knowledge, that is, its peculiar way of knowing objects. This leads to a new way of conceiving the real world, as human beings cannot know things as they are in themselves, but only things as they appear (als Erscheinungen), thus modified by the human way of knowing. Although this new way of conceiving the real world fully expresses Transcendental Idealism, the fundamental thesis of the Critique of Pure Reason, it seems to rest on another real world that does not appear but is presupposed as the guarantor of phenomenal reality: the world of things in themselves (Ding an sich selbst). However, as presupposing the reality of things in themselves means both engaging in Transcendental Realism (transzendentaler Realismus) and resurrecting the conflicts of reason, Kant, in the Fourth Paralogism of the first edition of the Critique (1781), argues that the reality of external objects can be testified by mere consciousness (immediate perception), since human beings do not deal with things in themselves but only with phenomena. As, from this perspective, it is not necessary to leave mere consciousness (bloßen Selbstbewußtsein) to prove the reality of external phenomena (KrV, A370; A375), critics of Transcendental Idealism (transzendentalen Idealismus) saw in this thesis a striking similarity between this idealism and Berkeleyan idealism, from which they accused Kant’s philosophy of being solipsistic. In response, Kant, in the Refutation of Idealism, a text included in the second edition of the Critique (1787), states that the empirical determination of existence (internal experience) presupposes something permanent (Beharrliche) external (which is not a representation) as its condition of possibility. From this, he concludes that “the consciousness of my own existence is, simultaneously, an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things exterior to me (anderer Dinge außer mir)” (KrV, B276). Considering this manifest oscillation between defending the external real world now as being constituted exclusively by phenomena (Fourth Paralogism of 1781), now as presupposing things in themselves (Refutation of Idealism), and thus also implying the existence of an external world constituted by things in themselves, the present thesis aims to highlight a conflicting conceptual structure at the core of Transcendental Philosophy (Transzendentalphilosophie) that prevents it from effectively determining the existence of a world of real external objects. This implies concluding that Kant’s theoretical philosophy inevitably and involuntarily leads to skepticism, as it does not allow for a secure judgment about truly external real objects.
Editora / Evento / Instituição: UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DA BAHIA
Tipo: Tese2025-05-23T00:00:00ZO declínio do espólio: razão, sofrimento e moralidade em Arthur Schopenhauer e Fiódor DostoiévskiCalou, Ângela Limahttps://repositorio.ufba.br/handle/ri/427312025-08-15T14:55:08Z2024-11-22T00:00:00ZTítulo: O declínio do espólio: razão, sofrimento e moralidade em Arthur Schopenhauer e Fiódor Dostoiévski
Autor(es): Calou, Ângela Lima
Primeiro Orientador: Saes, Sílvia Faustino de Assis
Abstract: The present work is determined as a dialogue between philosophy and literature through the articulation of the thought of Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) and the mature work of Fyodor Dostoevsky (1821-1881), with a view to exploring the visible relations from which it’s possible to support the thesis that the philosophy of one and the literature of the other illuminate each other mutually and even present an aspect of complementarity. In this attempt to interpret the extent to which the Dostoyevskian literary world is expressed in Schopenhauerian terms, the notions of reason, suffering and morality are placed in a central position. In concept and image, the ideal of a teleological history is doubly refused, bringing rationality back to the encounter with finitude. It’s the return to the problem of suffering, which doesn’t concern a stage to be overcome dialectically by the political and moral progress of humanity, but the constitutive dimension of the human being. It means to appreciate him according to his abysses: in the irrationality of his will, in the evil positively established by his colossal selfishness inscribed in the heart of a muted nature; but, also in the miracle of goodness which constitutes itself as moral action, founded on the feeling of compassion to express the intuition of the gratuitousness of universal pain. I propose the interpretation that these authors make up a dialogic field that represents a response to the ethical-existential problems arising from the optimism of rationalism and scientific positivism at that time. It isn’t, therefore, purported to affirm a relationship of influence, whose presupposition is the existence of a philosopher Dostoyevsky who makes his literature the instrument of realization of a hidden philosophy indebted to Schopenhauer’s work. Or that it is intended to be, before, signal that the images produced by the mature prose of the Muscovite writer lead to conceptually elaborated contents by the author of The World as Will and Representation, illuminating them not by a simple and remarkable coincidence, but by the fact that both take of a same malaise.
Editora / Evento / Instituição: UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DA BAHIA
Tipo: Tese2024-11-22T00:00:00ZO romance A náusea e a desconstrução do sujeito em SartrePinheiro, Rafael de Sousahttps://repositorio.ufba.br/handle/ri/422282025-06-03T12:55:39Z2025-03-28T00:00:00ZTítulo: O romance A náusea e a desconstrução do sujeito em Sartre
Autor(es): Pinheiro, Rafael de Sousa
Primeiro Orientador: Ferreira, Acylene Maria Cabral
Abstract: This thesis investigates the place and function occupied by the novel Nausea in the
philosophical context of the 1930s in Sartrean thought. To this end, we initially address the
specificities of the relationship between philosophy and literature in Sartre, as well as his notion
of “creative unity”. Then, when we analyze the subjectivity of philosophical construction and
the existential phenomenology project, we note that when Sartre criticizes Husserl's conception
of the ego, the motivations and justification of Epoché, he realizes that this suspension is not
an intellectual method, but an anguish, this leads us to elucidate an internal need of Sartre's
philosophy in relation to literature, which is to understand human reality in its ambiguity and
contingency, since they are not reducible to philosophical conceptual expression. Finally, by
examining the novel Nausea considering the philosophical background and literary problems
belonging to the Sartrian phenomenological-existential construction, we explain that the novel
function is the literary idealism deconstruction in face of the bourgeois spirit, as well as the
subject idea, and that the place occupied by the novel in Sartrian creative unit is a double of
Sketch for a Theory of Emotions.
Editora / Evento / Instituição: Universidade Federal da Bahia
Tipo: Tese2025-03-28T00:00:00ZHeidegger e o ápice da metafísicaJesus, Adrielle Costa Gomes dehttps://repositorio.ufba.br/handle/ri/420222025-05-15T14:15:04Z2022-11-22T00:00:00ZTítulo: Heidegger e o ápice da metafísica
Autor(es): Jesus, Adrielle Costa Gomes de
Primeiro Orientador: Ferreira, Acylene Maria Cabral
Abstract: This thesis aims to problematize the proposal of overcoming metaphysics presented by
Heidegger and, with it, the place of his thought in the stage in which Western philosophy
reaches its extreme possibility. Some critics argue that his question of being inaugurates a
new mode of unveiling in the history of Western thought. And, therefore, they consider him
either as a philosopher of the end of metaphysics, or as responsible for the emergence of a
post-modern and post-humanist thought. We will see throughout this thesis that, despite such
interpretations, Heidegger does not understand the possibility of overcoming metaphysics as
a closure of the preceding history. But as a recognition of the unveiling of being as a
condition for the historicity from which metaphysics unfolded and in which we are situated.
With that, we will see that he is not consistent with his philosophy to think of it as an effort to
break with this tradition, nor to think of the possibility of an epochal transition as an effort of
an individual will. Such an overcoming depends on the dispositions of the being's own
history.
Editora / Evento / Instituição: Universidade Federal da Bahia
Tipo: Tese2022-11-22T00:00:00Z